Richard C. Jensen v. Mel A. Ball dba The Onvi Trust; The Onvi Trust; John O. Dawson; Dawson Real Estate Comapny Incorporated : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Richard C. Jensen v. Mel A. Ball dba The Onvi
Trust; The Onvi Trust; John O. Dawson; Dawson
Real Estate Comapny Incorporated : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George S. Diumenti II; D. Bruce Oliver; Diumenti & Lindsley; Attorneys for Appellant.
Michael M. Later; Brian J. Romriell; Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups; Attorneys for
Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Jensen v. Ball, No. 880706 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1472
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BftlCF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A 10 
^Crftb 
DOCKET NO. TN TF^ TTTftH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD C. JENSEN, an individual, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MEL A. BALL, an individual, dba 
THE OVNI TRUST; THE OVNI TRUST; 
JOHN O. DAWSON, an individual; 
DAWSON REAL ESTATE COMPANY 
INCORPORATED, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Docket No. 880706-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Second Judicial District Court 
In and For Davis County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page, Presiding 
George S. Diumenti II 
D. Bruce Oliver 
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Michael M. Later 
Brian J. Romriell 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 13 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-07840 
Attorneys for Respondent 
MAR 3 1989 
ber-mOl.bjr 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD C. JENSEN, an individual, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MEL A. BALL, an individual, dba 
THE OVNI TRUST; THE OVNI TRUST; 
JOHN 0. DAWSON, an individual; 
DAWSON REAL ESTATE COMPANY 
INCORPORATED, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Docket No. 880706-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Second Judicial District Court 
In and For Davis County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page, Presiding 
George S. Diumenti II 
D. Bruce Oliver 
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Michael M. Later 
Brian J. Romriell 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 13 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-07840 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ber-m01.bjr 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. BALL IMPROPERLY RAISES CLAIMS OF DISPUTED FACTS 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 5 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT BALL 
ELECTED LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AS HIS EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY BY RETAINING JENSEN'S EARNEST MONEY . . . . 5 
III. BALL HAD TO ELECT HIS REMEDY BEFORE FILING 
HIS COUNTERCLAIM 9 
IV. BALL HAD THE LEGAL RIGHT TO DIRECT DAWSON 
TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY TO JENSEN 12 
CONCLUSION 14 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
Rule 54(b) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 1 
CASES CITED 
Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah P.2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 
(1959) 6,7,13 
Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) 6 
Close v. Blumenthal. 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856, 
857 (1960) 6,7,8,12 
Dowdinq v. Land Funding LTD., 555 P.2d 957, 957 
(Utah 1976) 6,7,8 
McMullin v. Shimmin. 10 Utah 2d 142, 349 P.2d 720 
(1960) 6,7,8,10,11 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc., 
761 P. 2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) 5 
Western Surety Co. v. Murphy. 754 P.2d 1237, 1240 
(Utah App. 1988) 5 
Zions First Nat7! Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) 5 
OTHERS 
Administrative Rules of the Division of Real Estate, Utah 
Department of Business, Rule 4.2.7.3 13,14 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court of an order 
granting summary judgment on the issue of a seller's election of 
remedies under a real estate earnest money agreement. The District 
Court's Order was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The case was transferred to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Can a seller retain the earnest money paid under an earnest 
money agreement and then afterwards also sue for damages in 
contravention of the agreement's election of remedies clause? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant/appellant, Mel A. Ball dba The OVNI Trust 
(hereafter "Ball"), is appealing from the district court's grant of 
partial summary judgment in favor of Richard A. Jensen the 
plaintiff/respondent (hereafter "Jensen"). Ball was the seller and 
Jensen the purchaser in a real estate transaction which was never 
completed. The parties entered into an Earnest Money Agreement, but 
Jensen refused to close the sale of the property because Ball had 
misrepresented the size of the building on the property. After 
unsuccessfully demanding return of his earnest money deposit, Jensen 
filed a complaint seeking return of the earnest money. Ball retained 
the earnest money and also counterclaimed against Jensen, seeking 
damages for breach of the agreement. 
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On December 9, 1987, Jensen filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment to dismiss Ball's damage claims on the grounds that 
under the terms of the earnest money agreement Ball was required to 
make an election between the nonjudicial remedy of retaining Jensen's 
earnest money and the judicial remedy of instituting a suit. The 
parties filed memoranda supporting and opposing the motion and the 
court heard oral argument on the matter on January 19, 1988. 
After oral argument, the court took the matter under 
advisement and on March 28, 1988, issued its "Ruling on Motion for 
Summary Judgment," (hereafter "District Court's Ruling") [Record on 
Appeal (hereafter "Record") at 278-283], granting Jensen's motion. 
The court ruled that Ball was on notice that Jensen "did not intend 
to abide by the Earnest Money Agreement at the latest when they 
accepted service of plaintiff's complaint on May 14, 1986." [District 
Court Ruling at 3, Record at 280]. The court ruled that Ball, upon 
notice that the deal would not close, was required to elect his remedy 
and that he could not both retain the earnest money and institute a 
lawsuit. The court then applied Supreme Court precedent to conclude 
that Ball's retention of the earnest money was incontrovertible 
evidence that Ball had elected to retain the money as his exclusive 
remedy. 
Jensen stipulated to a Rule 54(b) motion which the court 
granted, thus permitting an immediate appeal of the ruling. Ball 
filed his Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court on October 11, 1988 
and the case was later transferred to the Court of Appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 25, 1986, Jensen entered into an Earnest Money 
Agreement with Ball for the purchase of warehouse space in North Salt 
Lake, Utah. Under the terms of the agreement, Jensen paid $25,000 
earnest money to Ball's real estate agent, John O. Dawson. Prior to 
February 1986, Ball and Dawson had entered into a listing agreement 
which provided that Ball would pay a commission to Dawson upon sale 
of the property. [Findings of Fact and Order (hereafter "Order") at 
% 6, Record at 211]. 
A closing was scheduled for May 1986. Following the signing 
of the Earnest Money Agreement and prior to closing, a dispute arose 
over several important aspects of the agreement and the deal fell 
through. Among other things, Ball misrepresented the square footage 
available for warehouse space and neglected to make repairs and 
improvements which he was obligated to make. 
The parties were unable to work out the difficulties. Both 
parties maintained and continue to maintain that the other party 
breached the contract. Although Jensen demanded return of the earnest 
money, Ball did not return or offer to return the earnest money paid 
under the agreement. [Order at % 14, Record at 212]. 
On May 9, 1986, Jensen brought an action against Ball, 
seeking a recision of the agreement and a return of the $25,000 
earnest money. On June 12, 1986, Ball counterclaimed, seeking damages 
against Jensen for breach of the agreement. [Order at f 13, Record 
at-211-12]. On September 15, 1987, fifteen months after Ball filed 
his counterclaim, he testified in his deposition that he had consulted 
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with his attorney and would not return the earnest money. [Deposition 
of Mel A. Ball at 47-48, Record at 187-88.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The express language of the earnest money agreement executed 
by Ball and Jensen requires that Ball elect either to retain the 
earnest money or institute a suit. This provision allowed Ball to 
chose between a judicial and nonjudicial remedy but precluded him from 
electing both. Ball violated the provision by retaining the earnest 
money and making a counterclaim against Jensen. Supreme Court 
precedent clearly provides that Ball's failure to return or offer to 
return the earnest money prior to bringing a cause of action against 
Jensen is incontrovertible evidence that Ball chose to retain the 
earnest money as his sole and exclusive remedy. As a matter of law, 
Ball is precluded from seeking additional damages under his 
counterclaim against Jensen. 
Ball's argument that the trial court first must determine 
the issue of breach before Ball has to elect his remedy is a 
nonsequitur. Such a requirement would render the election of remedies 
clause meaningless and would directly contravene the contractual 
provision binding the parties as well as settled supreme court 
decisions. 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment on the issue 
of Ball's election of remedies was based upon undisputed material 
facts, the express language of the agreement and settled case law. 
There is no basis for reversing the decision and it should be 
affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
BALL IMPROPERLY RAISES CLAIMS OF 
DISPUTED FACTS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Ball attempts to persuade the Court of Appeals that summary 
judgment is improper in this case by raising assertions of disputed 
facts for the first time on appeal. It is improper to make arguments 
for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the arguments are 
of fact or of law. See, e.g. , Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Zions 
First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 
(Utah 1988)); Western Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Utah 
App. 1988). The court should refuse to consider such arguments. For 
example, Ball asserts that the amount of liquidated damages in this 
case is disputed. [Appellant's Brief at 7]. Ball never asserted this 
claim before the district court and it should be disregarded in 
reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT BALL 
ELECTED LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AS HIS EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY BY RETAINING JENSEN'S EARNEST MONEY. 
This case is not one of first impression and the issue on 
appeal is controlled by settled Supreme Court precedent. The District 
Court examined the language of the earnest money agreement, reviewed 
the Supreme Court cases and correctly ruled that Ball elected to 
retain Jensen's earnest money as his exclusive remedy under the 
ber-mOl.bjr 5 
Earnest Money Agreement between Ball and Jensen.1 Having elected to 
retain the earnest money, Ball is precluded from seeking additional 
damages. 
The Earnest Money Agreement [Record at 175-81], expressly 
provides: 
In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to 
either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. 
Earnest Money Agreement at f N (emphasis added), Record at 178. 
Ball's rights and obligations under paragraph N were clear: he was 
required to "elect" between retaining the earnest money and 
instituting a suit. He could not choose both. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that a seller cannot bring a suit for damages if he 
retains the earnest money: 
[WJhere there has been a retention of the deposit by 
the seller, an action will not lie for recovery of 
damages for breach of the contract. 
McMullin v. Shimmin. 10 Utah 2d 142, 349 P.2d 720 (1960). See also 
Dowdincr v. Land Funding LTD., 555 P.2d 957, 957 (Utah 1976); Close 
v. Blumenthal. 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856, 857 (1960); Andreasen v. 
Hansen, 8 Utah P.2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959); Cf. Cadv v. Johnson, 
671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
The only question remaining in this case is determining 
when Ball was required to make his election. The above-cited cases 
make it clear that if the seller does not return the earnest money 
The District Court made it clear in its "Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment" entered March 28, 
1988, that the only facts upon which it relied were undisputed facts. Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 1, Record at 278. 
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prior to bringing a suit, he will be barred from seeking additional 
damages against the buyer. Dowdinq, 555 P. 2d at 957; Close, 354 P. 2d 
at 857; McMullin. 349 P.2d at 721; Andreasen, 335 P.2d at 408. 
Consequently, this case does not require precise line drawing as to 
when Ball was required to make this election. It is immaterial 
whether he was required to make his election when Jensen first 
demanded return of the earnest money, when Jensen filed suit, or 
prior to Ball filing his own suit. The undisputed fact is that 
fifteen months after he filed his own suit, Ball continued to assert 
his intention to retain the earnest money and has never, throughout 
these proceedings, tendered its return to Jensen. [Order at f 14, 
Record at 212]. The cases make it clear that at the latest. Ball had 
to make his election before filing his counterclaim. Having failed 
to do so, he is now precluded from seeking additional damages. 
Ball fails to cite any cases to support his position. 
Further, he does not identify any relevant factual distinctions 
between this case and controlling Supreme Court precedent. In 
several instances he either misreads the cases or misrepresents the 
facts of this case.2 Ball argues that this case is different from 
prior cases because the buyer has contested his liability. In 
effect, Ball is arguing that if a buyer disputes a seller's right to 
go after either remedy, the seller gains the right to go after both 
remedies. Yet the court in McMullin expressly stated that the buyers 
For example, Ball represents that "[t]he amount of liquidated damages was not agreed upon." 
Appellant's Brief at 7. There is no basis for this assertion. It is undisputed that both parties executed the 
earnest money agreement, [Order at 51 1, Record at 210], and that the agreement provided that Ball could elect 
to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages. [Order at % U, Record at 211]. The executed agreement is 
a matter of record and Ball cannot disregard its express provisions for the first time on appeal. 
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in that case also denied liability. McMullin, 349 P. 2d at 720. 
Despite that fact, the court held that the seller had to elect his 
remedy prior to bringing suit.3 
The fact that Jensen disputed liability or that Ball filed 
his action as a counterclaim to Jensen's suit is simply irrelevant. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Dowdinq v. Land Funding Ltd., 555 
P.2d 957 (1976): 
Dowding's brief attempts to point out 
factual distinctions between cases that 
heretofore we have processed, such as one being 
in equity instead of at law, one suing for less 
than all the contract price, etc., which we 
consider to be distinctions without pertinence 
to the basic problem, that under the terms of the 
Earnest Money Agreement if the sale is not 
consummated, the damages are as mentioned above, 
where the Seller opts to retain the amounts paid 
as was the case here, where no offer to return 
the sum was made. 
Id. at 957 (footnote omitted) . The basic problem in this case is 
exactly the same as the problem posed to the Supreme Court in the 
above-cited cases: the seller is attempting to avoid electing his 
remedies by instituting a suit while at the same time retaining the 
earnest money. 
The election required under the earnest money agreement is 
not an election of one among several judicial remedies. Certainly, 
a seller who tenders the earnest money to a buyer and elects to 
institute a suit can still elect among judicial remedies such as 
damages or specific performance. The election in this case, however, 
Further, contrary to Ball's representation in his brief [Appellant's Brief at 7], there is no 
indication in Close v. Blumenthal. 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856, 857 (1960), to suggest that in Close the "breach 
was undisputed." 
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requires that the seller choose between a judicial remedy 
(instituting a suit) and a nonjudicial remedy (retaining the earnest 
money). Having availed himself of the nonjudicial remedy by 
retaining the earnest money, Ball no longer has the option of 
pursuing the judicial remedy. 
III. 
BALL HAD TO ELECT HIS REMEDY BEFORE FILING HIS COUNTERCLAIM 
In an attempt to avoid the limitations of the election of 
remedies provision, Ball argues that his duty to elect remedies 
arises upon a default. Because Jensen denies that he has any 
liability to Ball, Ball reasons, that a "default," and hence Ball's 
obligation to elect a remedy, will arise only if and when the court 
judicially pronounces that Jensen defaulted. Additionally, Ball 
argues that it is "extremely untenable" to require a seller to elect 
his remedy before he "knows" whether or not the buyer breached the 
contract. [Appellant's Brief at 6 (emphasis in original)]. Ball's 
tortured interpretation of the election of remedies provision, in 
fact, turns that provision on its head. 
If Jensen defaulted on his obligations under the earnest 
money agreement, which Jensen denies, that default occurred when 
Jensen refused to close the sale of the property. It is entirely 
undisputed that Ball was aware, at least by the time Jensen filed the 
complaint seeking return of his earnest money deposit, that Jensen 
would not close the sale. At that time, Ball could have been 
uncertain about only one thing: Was Jensen correct in claiming that 
Jensen was relieved of any obligations under the earnest money 
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agreement because Ball had breached the agreement, or was Jensen in 
default. If Jensen is correct, Ball has defaulted on the contract, 
relieving Jensen of any obligation, and Ball is entitled neither to 
retain the earnest money nor to recover damages. 
If, on the other hand, Ball is correct, then Jensen 
defaulted three years ago when he refused to close the sale. The 
election of remedies provision is operative upon "default" and the 
only possible default by Jensen in this case occurred in 1986. 
Although Ball argues that he cannot elect his remedy until the court 
determines the issue of breach, Ball has, in fact, already adopted 
the position that Jensen defaulted and elected both remedies: he 
retained the earnest money without tendering it to Jensen and 
instituted a cause of action against Jensen. Ball is in essence 
arguing that the possibility that he is not entitled to either form 
of relief entitles him to seek both. 
In McMullin v. Shimmin. 10 Utah 2d 142, 720 P.2d 349 (1960) , 
the Utah Supreme Court was faced with deciding the point at which a 
seller must elect his remedy under an earnest money agreement. The 
seller in McMullin retained $100 earnest money and brought a suit for 
damages against the buyer. As in this case, the buyers "den[ied] any 
liability." Id. at 720. The district court dismissed the complaint 
at the pre-trial conference "for failure to return or offer to return 
the earnest money prior to suit." Id. at 721 (emphasis added). The 
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint and stated: 
The only question as to whether such limit 
[to damages] applies is whether or not the option 
has been exercised. Such option is exercised by 
retention of the down payment. The clause tells 
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the parties that the seller need only to retain 
the sum to exercise his right to keep it. The 
seller chooses the language. His retention 
become meaningful when he claims the buyer has 
breached the contract and refuses to go through 
with it. 
Id. (emphasis added). Ball expressly claimed at the time he filed 
his counterclaim that Jensen had breached the agreement. [See Ball's 
Counterclaim at % 7, Record at 41]. The Supreme Court has identified 
the seller's claim of breach as the operative event requiring the 
seller to elect his remedy. 
Ball also argues that it is "extremely untenable" to 
require a seller to elect his remedy before he "knows" whether or not 
the buyer breached the contract. In effect, Ball asks this Court to 
allow him to pursue his damage claims and to "elect" his remedy only 
after a verdict as to the amount of damages, if any, awardable to 
Ball has been entered. At that point, Ball could compare the 
liquidated damages and the jury award and select the greater amount. 
This interpretation of Ball's obligation to elect his remedy turns 
the contract language upside down and results in the truly 
"untenable" result. 
The seller in Close v. Blumenthal, 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 
856 (1960), similarly wanted to retain the earnest money and 
simultaneously bring a law suit. The Court soundly rejected this 
possibility: 
It is further to be observed that to permit the 
seller to retain the money and also to sue for 
specific performance would in effect render the 
option clause meaningless by not requiring him to 
exercise his option. . . . That he has his 
choice is enough without giving him the advantage 
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of both alternatives and thus providing two 
strings to his bow. 
Id, at 857. Ball seeks the advantage of both alternative remedies, 
an option which has been expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court 
and must be rejected here as well. 
IV. 
BALL HAD THE LEGAL RIGHT TO DIRECT DfrWSON 
TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY TO JENSEN. 
Ball argues that he cannot return the earnest money to 
Jensen since it is in the real estate agent's possession. It is 
undisputed, however, that Dawson acted as Ball's agent. See Order 
at f 7, 10, Record at 10.A The listing agreement between Ball and 
Dawson is part of the record [Record at 174], and Ball admitted that 
Dawson was his agent in his deposition. Ball and Dawson were 
represented jointly by the same counsel before the district court and 
neither Ball nor Dawson contested the agency relationship. 
Consequently, Ball was in at least constructive possession of the 
earnest money and could have tendered it to Jensen. Addressing a 
similar situation, the Supreme Court stated: 
The fact is that the defendants' $50 was kept, 
and that there was no return nor tender of return 
of the money. We are not unmindful of the 
testimony to the effect that the $50 was in the 
custody of the Holt Realty Co. But that company 
was the appointed agent and acting for the 
plaintiffs, and the money was thus, 
constructively at least, in their possession. 
See also Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Statement of 
Undisputed Facts INI 1, 5, Record at 162-63; Ball Depo. at 27, Record at 183. 
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Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404, 408 (1959). Ball 
is in constructive possession of the earnest money but never returned 
nor tendered return of the money to Jensen. 
Ball attempts to excuse his failure to return the money by 
asserting that Dawson was also Jensen's agent. Ball bases this 
assertion on the deposition testimony of Brian Call. A review of 
that testimony, however, provides no evidence of any agency 
relationship between Jensen and Dawson. 
Furthermore, an assertion that Dawson had some relationship 
with Jensen is irrelevant. Even presuming the existence of such a 
relationship, Ball still could have instructed Dawson to return the 
earnest money. The procedure for disbursing earnest money held in 
trust by a broker is not dependant upon the broker's agency 
relationship. The Administrative Rules of the Division of Real 
Estate, Utah Department of Business, Rule 4.2.7.3 provides: 
When it becomes apparent to the principal 
broker that a transaction has failed, or if a 
party to the failed transaction requests 
disbursement of the earnest money or other trust 
funds, those funds may be disbursed by the 
principal broker only if a written release is 
obtained from the parties not receiving the 
funds.5 
Rule 4.2.7.3 (1986) (emphasis added). Under the terms of Rule 
4.2.7.3, Ball could have instructed Dawson to return the earnest 
money without any action by Jensen and regardless of any relationship 
between Jensen and Dawson. On the other hand, Jensen could not have 
The Rule further provides that the money must be turned over to the court only when the broker is 
unable to obtain a signed written release under Rule A.2.7.3. 
ber-mOl.bjr 13 
received the funds from Dawson without Ball's written consent, even 
if Dawson had been Jensen's agent. 
The critical and undisputed fact is that Ball never 
tendered return of the earnest money and openly asserted, even after 
filing his counterclaim, that he intended to retain the earnest 
money. Ball never requested that Dawson disburse the funds to 
Jensen. This is merely a further attempt to avoid the effects of the 
incontrovertible election which Ball has already made. 
CONCLUSION 
Ball and Jensen contractually agreed that if Jensen 
breached the agreement, Ball could either retain $25,000 earnest 
money as liquidated damages or bring a law suit. Ball violated this 
provision by doing both. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
failure to return the earnest money prior bringing an action for 
damages serves as "incontrovertible evidence" that the seller has 
elected to retain the earnest money as his "sole and exclusive 
remedy." 
The fact that Jensen disputes liability and that Ball 
brought his action as a counterclaim to a suit by Jensen is 
irrelevant. Further, there is no legal or logical support for Ball's 
argument that the court must first determine who was liable for the 
breach before Ball has to elect his remedy under paragraph N. The 
possibility that Ball is not entitled to either form of relief does 
not entitle him to seek both. 
Ball has never made any offer or attempt to return the 
earnest money and has testified that he intends to retain the earnest 
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money. The Supreme Court has stated that its election of remedies 
rule applies even though the earnest money is in the seller's agent's 
possession. Furthermore, the Administrative Rules for the Utah 
Division of Real Estate permit Ball to direct that Dawson return the 
earnest money to Jensen regardless of Dawson's agency relationship to 
Ball or Jensen. Ball never gave Dawson such an instruction. 
The District Court correctly applied controlling Supreme 
Court precedent and granted Jensen's motion for partial summary 
judgment. For the above-stated reasons, the Utah Court of Appeals 
should AFFIRM the district courtis decision. 
Submitted this C7 *^ day of March, 1989. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
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